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Abstract: The need for secure communication between the nodes in a network has led to the 
development of various key distribution schemes. Blom’s scheme is a prominent key exchange 
protocol used for sensor and wireless networks, but its shortcomings include large computation 
overhead and memory cost. In this paper, we propose an efficient key management scheme by 
generating new public and private keys. We also focus on making Blom’s scheme dynamic by 
randomly changing the secret key that is generated by the base station and we propose the use of 
the mesh array for matrix multiplication for reducing the computation overhead.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent improvements in the field of electronic and computer technologies, have paved the way 
for the proliferation of wireless sensor networks (WSN).These sensors are used to collect 
environmental information and they have been considered for various purposes, including 
security monitoring, target tracking and research activities in hazardous environments. 
Encryption, authentication, confidentiality and key management are the main aspects to focus on 
to achieve security in wireless sensor networks. Different key management schemes have been 
developed for authentication and confidentiality purposes. Symmetric algorithm base key 
management protocols are used in wireless sensor networks because key management protocols 
based on public key cryptography are inefficient due to resource limitations.  
 
Blom’s scheme [1] and others related to it [2]-[10] to it are often used for secure sensor 
communication. Issues that need to be considered include key management [13]-[17] and 
randomness of sequences [18]-[23]. In this paper we review general considerations and then 
propose our scheme for dynamic change of keys. We present results of our simulations. 
 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The main challenges of the sensor nodes are as follows: 
 The nodes are solely responsible for any change in the configuration as there would be no 
human intervention once the sensor network is deployed. 
 There is only a finite source of energy as the nodes are not connected to any other energy 
source. Hence, communication should be minimized.  
 It is required that a sensor network system be adaptable to changing connectivity as well 
as changing environmental stimuli. 
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Sensor networks have various requirements:  
Integrity: Data integrity ensures that the data received by the recipient node is same as the data 
sent by the sender node and is not altered or modified by any adversary. Different cryptography 
techniques can be employed to ensure integrity of data.  
Authentication and Confidentiality: The two nodes (sender and receiver) must be authenticated 
before data transmission. It means that the receiving node must be ensured that the data is sent 
from a trusted node and not from any malicious node. Also, the data that is sent must be received 
only by the authenticated receiver and must not be exposed to any other nodes.  
Availability, reliability and resiliency: It ensures proper connectivity of the nodes and that the 
data and information is available to access at all times whenever and wherever required by the 
authorized nodes. This ensures protection from attacks such as denial of service attacks, etc. It 
also ensures that the data packet is delivered to its destination.  
Data freshness: It ensures that only recent data must be delivered. It can be helpful to detect the 
adversary nodes as they can send the old messages. 
In order to perform better in terms of accuracy, reliability and security there are some limitations 
that need to be overcome. Some of the limitations are: (1) Energy: Sensor network consists of 
tiny sensors which run on batteries. These batteries have limited power supply. Hence there 
comes the need to conserve energy and transmit data efficiently without consuming much 
energy. (2) Computation: Due to energy constraints, sensors is also limited by low computational 
capacity. Hence, algorithms which require large computations must be avoided to incorporate in 
sensor networks. (3) Communication: Sensors are linked via wireless connection, and therefore 
the bandwidth is often limited. This also limits the transmission of data and information.  
Generating Symmetric Matrix  
In the Blom’s scheme, the Central Authority or the base station randomly generates the secret 
key which is a symmetric matrix. Here, we obtain the secret symmetric matrix by multiplying a 
random matrix with its transpose. 
 
The secret symmetric matrix may be updated in a variety of ways: 
 The symmetric matrix multiplied by its transpose. 
 The symmetric matrix added with another symmetric matrix. 
which will again be a symmetric matrix that can be used as a secret matrix. 
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Mesh Array for Matrix Multiplication 
The mesh array of matrix multiplication [11],[12] was introduced in 1988 to speed up the 
computation of multiplying two n×n matrices using distributed computing nodes. In contrast to 
the standard array that requires 3n-2 steps to complete its computation, the mesh array requires 
only 2n-1 steps. The speedup of the mesh array is a consequence of the fact that no zeros are 
padded in its inputs. In the modified Blom’s scheme, the mesh array for matrix multiplication 
can be used by the central authority or the base station for generating the private matrix and by 
the user pair in order to obtain the shared key by multiplying the public and private key.  
Consider two 4*4 matrices: 
A= [
𝑎11 𝑎12 𝑎13 𝑎14
𝑎21 𝑎22 𝑎23 𝑎24
𝑎31 𝑎32 𝑎33 𝑎34
𝑎41 𝑎42 𝑎43 𝑎44
]    B= [
𝑏11 𝑏12 𝑏13 𝑏14
𝑏21 𝑏22 𝑏23 𝑏24
𝑏31 𝑏32 𝑏33 𝑏34
𝑏41 𝑏42 𝑏43 𝑏44
] 
The mesh architecture for multiplying the above two matrices (C=AB) is given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-1: Mesh Array for Matrix Multiplication 
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Figure-2: Computing node that generates c= a11b11+a12b21 
Properties of Mesh Array for Matrix Multiplication: 
 For a matrix with odd order, the rows 2 to (n+1) /2 are mirror image of rows (n+3) /2 to 
n.  
 
 For a matrix with even order, the rows 2 to n/2 are mirror reversed image to rows n/2+2 
to  n, and the middle row (n/2+1) has self-symmetry. 
 
BLOM’S SCHEME 
Blom’s scheme [1] is a symmetric threshold key exchange cryptography protocol. It allows any 
pair of users in the system to find a unique shared key for secure communication.  
 In this scheme, a network with N users and a collusion of less than t+1 users cannot 
reveal the keys which are held by other users. Thus, the security of the network depends 
on the chosen value of t, which is called Blom’s secure parameter (t<<N).  
 Larger value of t leads to greater resilience but a very high t value increases the amount 
of memory required to store key information.  
 Generation of Public matrix: 
Initially, a central authority or base station first constructs a (t + 1) ×N matrix P over a 
finite field GF (q), where N is the size of the network and q is the prime number. P is 
known to all users and it can be constructed using a Vandermonde matrix. It can be 
shown that any t+1 columns of P are linearly independent when ni, i=1, 2,…N are all 
distinct. 
P = 
[
 
 
 
 
1 1 1 … 1
𝑛1 𝑛2 𝑛3 … 𝑛𝑁
𝑛1
2 𝑛2
2 𝑛3
2 … 𝑛𝑁
2
… . . . …… …… …… ……
𝑛1
𝑡 𝑛2
𝑡 𝑛3
𝑡 … 𝑛𝑁
𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 Generation of Secret Key (Private matrix): 
C 
𝑏21
𝑏11
 
  
 
𝑎12
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The central authority or the base station selects a random (t + 1) × (t + 1) symmetric 
matrix S over GF (q), where S is secret and only known by the central authority.  
A N × (t + 1) matrix A = (S. P) 
T
 is computed which is needed for generating the shared 
key. 
 K =A. P   = (S. P) 
T
. P  = P
T
. S
T
.P  = P
T
.S.P = (A.P) 
T
  = K
T
 
 Generation of shared key by the user pair: 
User pair (i, j) will use Kij, the element in row i and column j in K, as the shared key. 
Because Kij is calculated by the i-th row of A and the j-th column of P, the central 
authority assigns the i-th row of A matrix and the i-th column of P matrix to each user i, 
for 1, 2….. N. Therefore, when user i and user j need to establish a shared key between 
them, they first exchange their columns of P, and then they can compute Kij and Kji, 
respectively, using their private rows of A. It has been proved in [10] that the above 
scheme is t-secure if any t + 1 columns of G are linearly independent.  
 The t-secure parameter guarantees that no compromise of up to t nodes has any 
information about Kij or Kji. 
                       A= (S.P) 
T
                            P                           (S.P) 
T
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Figure-3:Generating keys in Blom’s Scheme 
Proposed Algorithm for Distributing Keys:  
In the original Blom’s scheme all the computations that are involved in generating the keys are 
based on a Vandermonde matrix [24] which is a public matrix (P) and known to even the 
adversaries. The security of the network depends on the secure parameter t. However, for large 
values of t, number of rows in the matrix increases and which in turn corresponds to a greater 
value in the columns because the column values increase in a geometric series.  
 
The proposed method makes use of the original Blom’s scheme. In the Blom’s scheme for any 
two nodes to generate a shared key, each node should store its private key and the public key of 
the other node. Since every sensor node is provided with limited memory and energy, it will be 
difficult to store both the row and column in the sensor memory for a large network. So, the goal 
is to reduce the memory and computation overhead. To achieve this in Blom’s scheme, instead 
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of using Vandermonde matrix we propose the use any random matrix as the public matrix. The 
overall computation cost can also be reduced because the cost of generating a random matrix is 
less as compared to the cost of generating a Vandermonde matrix. Also, a random prime number 
q is chosen. Now, similar to Blom’s scheme the operation which are to be performed to generate 
the keys will depend on the prime number, i.e., the number which depends on the desired key 
length. 
Following are the steps involved in calculating the shared key using the proposed scheme: 
 Generation of Public matrix: 
Initially, any random matrix of order (t+1) * (t+1) is chosen as the public matrix.  
 Generation of Secret matrix (symmetric matrix): 
The central authority calculates a (t + 1) × (t + 1) symmetric matrix S, where S is secret 
and only known by the central authority. 
 Generation of Private Matrix for obtaining the shared key: 
A matrix of order N × (t + 1), A = (S. P) 
T
 is computed which is used for generating the 
shared key. The base station stores each row of the matrix A in the node memory with  
corresponding index. This is shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-4. The network 
 Assigning Unique ID: 
The Central Authority assigns unique id’s to all the nodes in the network, which is public 
to the entire network before the public and private matrices are calculated. Once the node 
receives its unique id, it responds to the CA with an acknowledge type message or a 
reply.  
A question here arises, what if there is already an intruder in the network before assigning 
id’s or how to distinguish a new node that enters a network as a trusted node or a 
malicious node. For this reason, we assume that every node is authenticated in some other 
Base Station 
 
Alice 
Bob David
 
Charlie
Sensor nodes 
7 
 
network before it enters this network. The following handshake takes place before the 
node enters any network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-5 New Node Authentication 
 Now, if suppose Alice and Bob want to communicate with each other, they require the 
private key from the central authority to calculate the shared key. In order to obtain the 
key, the following handshake takes place.  
 
Verifies with the 
CA of that network 
and authenticates 
the node  
 
NODE CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
AUDUUTHORITY 
Verifies that the  
Node is not 
attacked and 
stops the 
handshake 
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Figure-6 Private key Distribution 
 The CA maintains the following intrusion table for the malicious nodes. 
 
ID (malicious nodes) INTRUSION COUNT 
 
 MN1 
 MN2 
 
 1 
 2 
TABLE-1 Intrusion Table 
 In any of the above steps, if the Central Authority detects any node to be malicious, it 
then updates the unique id value of that node as MN1, increments the intrusion count by 
1, blocks all the communication in that particular path and multicasts it to all the nodes in 
the network. 
  Generation of shared key: 
Finally user pair (Alice, Bob) can compute the shared key by multiplying the secret row 
of matrix A stored in the node with column of the public matrix corresponding to the 
 
Verifies the id 
and sends the 
private key  
 
NODE CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
AUDUUTHORITY 
Verifies the id 
and stops the 
handshake 
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node index with which it want to communicate. The key generation between any two 
nodes is shown in the following Figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-7. Generating keys  
 Dynamic Secret Matrix: 
The CA dynamically updates the secret matrix in each of the following cases: 
 For every increment of the intrusion count in the intrusion table. 
 Suppose, if node i wants to communicate with node j (both i and j being trusted 
parties and not intruders). Once, the CA gives the private key to both the nodes, it 
updates the secret matrix for the next request from the nodes. 
The CA does the following handshake at regular time intervals in order to detect the malicious 
nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-8: Malicious Nodes Detection 
 
 
NODE CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
AUDUUTHORITY 
Verifies to check if the 
updated ID is sent to the 
trusted node and stops the 
handshake 
Verifies if the id 
values matches 
with the one 
assigned 
Alice
Bob 
KAlice,Bob = KBob,Alice 
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 Once the shared key has been established between the nodes, before the nodes start 
communicating with each other, the following handshake takes place between the nodes 
and the Central Authority in order to authenticate each other. 
Let us consider that Alice wants to communicate with Bob: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-9: Node Authentication 
 
 
Further strengthening of the random sequences used can employ the methods of [25],[26].
 
 
    Alice            CA 
IDi  + IDj  +  shared key 
FLAG = 1 + asks for the key 
value again 
    Bob 
IDj  + IDi +  shared key 
Verifies if both the shared key 
values are same 
FLAG = 1 + asks for the 
key value again 
Verifies again to ensure there is 
no intrusion and stops the 
handshake 
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Implementation 
The example below shows the working of proposed Scheme that uses a random matrix as public 
key and generates a private key. Let us consider a network with 4 nodes and the following 
parameters: 
 Let C be the Central Authority or Base Station. 
 Secure parameter t = 3, which says if more than 3 nodes in the network are compromised, 
it is not possible to find the keys of other users. 
 Prime number q= 31. 
 As the public matrix (P) should be of the order (t+1) * (t+1), P can be taken as any 
random (3+1) * (3+1) matrix. 
              [
1 2 3 4
1 0 1 1
2 1 3 1
4 0 9 5
] 
 The secret symmetric matrix can be obtained as follows: 
Let us take a random matrix, 
A= [
1 0 1 1
1 2 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 2 3 1
]        B= [
1 1 0 0
0 2 0 2
1 0 1 3
1 1 1 1
] 
 
 
We obtain the secret matrix S by taking the product of two matrices A and B, 
S= [
3 2 2 4
2 6 1 5
2 1 2 4
4 5 4 14
] 
 
 Now, we calculate matrix A using, 
A = (S.P) 
T
 mod q 
(S.P)
 
= [
25 8 53 36
30 5 60 40
23 6 49 31
73 12 155 95
] 
 
A= (S.P) 
T
 mod 31 = [
25 8 22 5
30 5 29 9
23 6 18 0
11 12 0 2
] 
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Once A is calculated, each sensor node memory is filled with unique row chosen from A 
with corresponding index. These are the private keys for the nodes. 
 Now, for the key generation, we need the public and private keys of the nodes.  Suppose, 
Bob and Charlie wants to communicate with each other. In order to generate the shared 
secret key, Bob should multiply the private key given by the Central Authority from A 
with the public column of Charlie in P. 
 
 
 
 
Figure-11: Public and private key for an example pair 
 
 
 
 
Figure-10: Private and public keys 
 
K Bob, Charlie = ABob. PCharlie = [8 5 6 12] [
3
1
3
9
]  = 155 mod 31 = 0 
K Charlie, Bob = ACharlie. PBob = [22 29 18 0] [
2
0
1
0
] = 62 mod 31 = 0 
As seen above, both the nodes generate a common key and further communication can be done 
using the shared key generated. 
Let us assume the following: 
Alice – 1; Bob – 2; Charlie – 3; David – 4 
 
 
 
 
 Bob 
Charlie 
Public- [
3
1
3
9
] 
Private- 
[22 29 18 0] 
 
Public-[
2
0
1
0
] 
Private- 
[8 5 6 12] 
13 
 
The table below shows the Public and Private keys for different nodes: 
 
NODE PAIR 
 
(PUBLIC KEY)
T
 
 
PRIVATE KEY 
 
SHARED KEY 
K1,2 [2 0 1 0] [25 30 23 11] 11 
K2,1 [1 1 2 4] [8 5 6 12] 11 
K1,3 [3 1 3 9] [25 30 23 11] 25 
K3,1 [1 1 2 4] [22 29 18 0] 25 
K1,4 [4 1 1 5] [25 30 23 1] 22 
K4,1 [1 1 2 4] [5 9 0 2] 22 
K2,3 [3 1 3 9] [8 5 6 12] 0 
K3,2 [2 0 1 0] [22 29 18 0] 0 
K2,4 [4 1 1 5] [8 5 6 12] 10 
K4,2 [2 0 1 0] [5 9 0 2] 10 
K3,4 [4 1 1 5] [22 29 18 0] 11 
K4,3 [3 1 3 9] [5 9 0 2] 11 
TABLE-2: Key Generation for all nodes 
Now, the CA can anytime update the secret matrix S, to protect the network from malicious 
users. 
S’= [
3 2 2 4
2 6 1 5
2 1 2 4
4 5 4 14
]  [
4 5 4 14
2 1 2 4
2 6 1 5
3 2 2 4
] 
 
S’ = [
36 37 26 76
37 32 31 77
26 31 20 58
76 77 58 152
] 
 
The Private matrix A can be calculated as, 
A= (S.P) 
T
 mod q 
A = [
429 439 329 877
98 105 72 210
907 929 691 1847
587 596 445 1199
] Mod 31 
14 
 
A = [
26 5 19 9
5 12 10 24
8 30 9 18
29 7 11 21
] 
Now, suppose Bob and Charlie wants to communicate with each other. 
KBob, Charlie = ABob. PCharlie 
       = [5 12 10 24] [
3
1
3
9
] 
      = 273 mod 31  =  25 
KCharlie, Bob = ACharlie. PBob 
      = [8 30 9 18] [
2
0
1
0
] 
      = 25 mod 31  = 25 
Both the nodes generate a common key and further communication can be done using the shared 
key generated. 
ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION 
The main drawbacks of Blom’s scheme are memory overhead and computation overhead. This 
paper analyzes the ways to overcome these drawbacks. The modified Blom’s scheme proposes 
the use of random matrix as the public matrix instead of the Vandermonde matrix. This reduces 
the computational complexity corresponding to the columns in Vandermonde matrix. 
 
In this paper, we have performed an analysis between the original Blom’s scheme and the 
proposed Blom’s scheme with respect to computational effort. Different simulations have been 
made to a node size of 2,4,6, 8,10,20,30,40,50,100 and 200.  Also, the Blom’s scheme is made 
dynamic by changing the values of the secret matrix in order to protect the network from the 
malicious nodes. Different handshakes have been introduced so that the Central Authority can 
monitor the network at regular intervals. 
 
The results of the simulation show that the computational complexity of the modified Blom’s 
scheme is less when compared to that of the original Blom’s scheme.  
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Figure-11: Comparison of Original scheme and modified scheme 
 
Figure-12: Matrix Multiplication Complexity 
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CONCLUSION: 
The paper has shown that changes in the implementation of  Blom’s scheme provides new ways 
to protect the network from malicious nodes. An algorithm for dynamic changes of the keys is 
developed. Also, simulations are carried out for different node sizes and analyzed from the 
computational complexity point of view. We have shown how the protocols proposed for 
dynamic changing of keys can be run in an efficient manner. 
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